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ENFORCED SELF-REGULATION: A NEW 
STRATEGY FOR CORPORATE CRIME 
CONTROL 
John .Braithwaite* 
The criminal justice system's failure to control corporations1 has 
been well documented. 2 Piecemeal reforms or modest increases in 
enforcement budgets are unlikely to remedy this failure; indeed, · 
under the easygoing regulatory approach of the Reagan Administra-
tion, 3 it could become worse. Consequently, scholars studying cor-
porate crime should adopt the long view. Radical approaches are 
needed in the hope that some of them might blossom into control 
strategies more potent than our forlorn existing armory of weapons 
against corporate crime. Outstanding recent examples of such inno-
vation have been Coffee's proposal for the equity :fine4 and Fisse's 
suggestion that community service orders could be used as a sanction 
against corporations.5 It is unimportant that these proposals lack 
• Research Criminologist, Australian Institute of Criminology. B.A. 1972, University of 
Queensland; Ph.D. 1977, University of Queensland. - Ed. I wish to thank Brent Fisse, Donna 
Randall, Ross Cranston, Gil Geis, and the Socio-Legal Group at Northwestern University for 
helpful co=ents. 
I. Corporate crime is defined here as conduct of a corporation, or of individuals acting on 
behalf of a corporation, that is proscribed and punishable by law. Following Sutherland, see 
E. SUTHERLAND, WHITE-COLLAR CRIME (1949), I take the view that to exclude civil violations 
from a consideration of corporate crime is an arbitrary obfuscation because of the frequent 
provision in law for both civil and criminal prosecution of the same corporate conduct. In 
considerable measure, the power of corporations is manifested in the fact that their wrongs are 
so frequently punished only civilly. However, conduct subject only to damage awards without 
any additional punishment (e.g., fines or punitive damages) is not within the definition of 
corporate crime adopted here. 
2. See, e.g., M. CLINARD & P. YEAGER, CORPORATE CRIME (1980); R. NADER, M. GREEN 
& J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION (1976); J. REIMAN, THE RICH GET 
RICHER AND THE POOR GET PRISON (1979); Geis, Upperworld Crime, in CURRENT PERSPEC-
TIVES ON CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR (A. Blumberg ed. 1974). 
3. See, e.g., Hudson, SEC May Be Losing Its Former Toughness, Some Observers Think, 
Wall St. J., Mar. 22, 1982, at l, col. 6; Taylor, Antitrust Eeforcement Will Be More Selective, 
Two Big Cases Indicate, Wall St. J., Jan. 11, 1982, at l, col. I. 
4.· Coffee, "No Soul To J)amn: No Body To Kick'!· An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Prob-
lem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REv. 386, 413-24 (1981) (hereinafter cited as Coffee, 
Corporate Punishment); Coffee, Making the Punishment Fit the Corporation: The Problems of 
Finding an' Optimal Corporation Criminal Sanction, l N. ILL. U. L. REV. 3, 14-21 (1980), 
Under an "equity fine" approach the corporation would be forced to issue new equity securi-
ties to the value of the fine. For example, if a corporation had five million shares outstanding, 
a 10% equity fine would see 500,000 shares handed over to the state's crime victim compensa-
tion fund. 
5. Fisse, Community Service as a Sanction Against Corporations, 1981 Wis. L. REv. 970, 
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fine tuning, or that their authors have not suggested a politically re-
alistic strategy for their legislative adoption, for they have enlivened 
the intellectual landscape. Such ideas should not be prematurely 
discarded because of their deficiencies or impracticalities. The study 
of corporate crime needs a period when a thousand flowers are al-
lowed to bloom if it is tQ break out of the straight-jacket of the failed 
strategies of the past. This Article advocates another "impractical" 
idea for corporate crime control- government enforced self-regula-
tion of illegal corporate conduct. 
Part I outlines the concept of enforced self-regulation, sketches 
its theoretical underpinnings, and illustrates its application in the 
context of corporate accounting standards. Part II argues the merits 
of enforced self-regulation. Part III dispels notions that the proposal 
is a radical departure from existing regulatory practice and points to 
areas in which necessary empirical research could be conducted by 
discussing incipient manifestations of partial enforced self-regulation 
models in the aviation, mining, and pharmaceutical industries. Part 
IV considers in some detail the weaknesses of the proposed model. 
The final Part considers the importance of determining an optimal 
mix of regulatory strategies; it concludes that enforced self-regula-
tion could play an important role in such an optimal combination. 6 
I. CONTROLLING CORPORATE CRIME THROUGH 
ENFORCED SELF-REGULATION 
A. The Theory of Self-Regulation 
Self-regulation, whether or not fortified with the refinements pro-
posed by this Article, is an attractive alternative to direct govern-
mental regulation because the state simply cannot afford to do an 
adequate job on its own. Fiscal pressures invariably prevent govern-
mental inspectors from regularly checking every workplace for occu-
pational safety offenses, environmental quality lapses, crooked 
bookkeeping, or faulty product design.7 The uniformly abysmal in-
spection programs in these areas and others can and should be im-
6. During the past four years, I have been undertaking a rather large empirical research 
program on corporate crime and business regulation, partly alone and partly in collaboration 
with Professor Brent Fisse. Over 200 senior executives in fifty transnational companies, as well 
as many government officials, have been interviewed. Throughout this Article, points will be 
illustrated by reference to data gleaned from these interviews. Confidentiality was often prom-
ised in these discussions as a condition for obtaining more candid information. As a result, 
these sources will not be cited. Within the next year, two books providing more detail on 
much of the data will appear (J. BRAITHWAITE, CORPORATE CRIME IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL 
INDUSTRY (forthcoming); B. FISSE & J. BRAITHWAITE, BUSINESS REGULATION THROUGH 
PuBLICITY (tentative title) (forthcoming)). 
1. See M. CLINARD & P. YEAGER, supra note 2, at 95-97. 
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proved, but they will never reach a satisfactory level. 8 
A prograni of self-r€:gulation can dramatically expand coverage. 
Under the terms of Section 15A of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934,9 for example, the National Association of Securities Dealers 
(NASO) inspects the offices, books, and records of its members for 
violations of SEC regulations. In 1968 forty-five percent of NASD 
members were inspected under this program. 10 In 1969, by way of 
contrast, SEC inspectors surveyed only five-and-a-half percent of the 
dealers who were not members of the NASD. 11 
Self-regulation can also achieve greater inspectorial depth. In the 
international pharmaceutical industry, for example, a number of the 
more reputable companies have corporate compliance groups, which 
send teams of scientists to audit subsidiaries' compliance with pro-
duction quality codes. In one Australian subsidiary of an American 
firm that I visited, inspections by the headquarters compliance group 
were conducted twice yearly and were normally undertaken by three 
inspectors who spent over a week in the plant. The government 
health department inspection, on the other hand, consisted of an an-
nual one-day visit by a single inspector. While employees had ad-
vance warning of the government inspection, the corporate 
compliance group arrived unannounced. 
Corporate inspectors also tend, at least in the pharmaceutical in-
dustry, to be better trained than their government counterparts. 12 
Corporate inspectors' specialized knowledge of their employer's 
product lines also make them more effective probers than govern-
ment inspectors, who are forced to be generalists. Their greater tech-
nical capacity to spot problems is enhanced by a greater social 
capacity to do so. Corporate compliance personnel are more likely 
than government inspectors to know where "the bodies were bur-
ied," and to be able to detect cover-ups. One American pharmaceu-
tical executive explained in part why this is so: 
Our instructions to officers when dealing with FDA inspectors is to 
only answer the questions asked, not to provide any extra information, 
not to volunteer anything, and not to answer any questions outside 
8. Clinard and Yeager note that even if regulatory age!l.cy enforcement budgets were 
doubled, ''they would probably still be grossly inefficient to meet inspection and prosecution 
needs." Id. at 97. 
9. 15 u.s.c. § 78.-3 (1976). 
10. Katz, Industry Se!f-Regulation: A Viable Alternative to Government Regulation, in PRO-
TECTING CONSUMER INTERESTS 161, 167 (R. Katz ed. 1976). 
II. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 35TH ANNUAL Rl!PoRT 87-88 (1969), 
12. Many internal inspectors, for example, have Ph.Os. See J. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 6 
(forthcoming). 
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your area of competence. On the other hand we [the corporate compli-
. ance staff] can ask anyone anything and expect an answer. They are 
told that we are part of the same family, and, unlike the government, 
we are working for the same final objectives.13 
The power of corporate inspectors to trap suspected wrongdoers 
is often greater than that possessed by government investigators. 
One quality assurance manager told me of an instance where this 
power was used. His assay" staff was routinely obtaining test results 
showing the product to be at full strength. When they found a result 
of eighty percent strength, the manager suspected, the laboratory 
staff would assume that the assay was erroneous, simply mark the 
strength at 100%, and not recalculate the test. The manager's solu-
tion was to periodically "spike" the samples with understrength 
product to see whether his staff would pick out the defects. If not, 
they could be dismissed or sanctioned in some other way. Govern-
ment inspectors do not have the legal authority to enter a plant and 
entrap employees with a spiked production run. 14 
We have seen that corporations may be more capable than the 
government of regulating their business activities. But if they are 
more capable, they are not necessarily more willing to regulate ef-
fectively. This is the fundamental weakness of voluntary self-regula-
tion. A voluntary program will stop many violations that cost the 
company money and others that are cost-neutral; it will even halt 
some violations that benefit the company financially in the short-
term, for the sake of the long-term benefit of fostering employee 
commitment to compliance.15 Recommendations that involve conse-
quences beyond the cost-neutral or short term, however, commonly 
will be ignored. 
13. Perhaps this statement exaggerates the good will between company employees and in-
ternal compliance inspectors. I asked the production manager of the Guatemalan subsidiary 
of another company: "Do you think of the internal quality auditors from headquarters a part 
of the same team as you?" His answer probably grasped the reality: "I think of them as a pain 
in the ass." 
14. Another example of the greater effectiveness ofintemal U!5pectors concerns a medical 
director who suspected that one of his scientists was "graphiting" safety testing data. His 
hunch was that the scientist, whose job was to run 100 trials on a drug, instead ran 10 and 
fabricated the other 90 so they would be consistent with the first 10. The medical director 
possessed investigative abilities that would have been practically impossible for a governmen-
tal investigator. He could verify the number of animals taken from the animal store, the 
amount of drug substance that had been used, the number of samples that had been tested, as 
well as other facts. His familiarity with the laboratory made this easy. As an insider, he could 
probe quietly without raising the kind of alarm that might lead the criminal to pour an appro-
priate amount of drug substance down the sink. 
15. One pharmaceutical quality control director showed me that his firm had failed a batch 
of drugs for being slightly overstrength, even though the FDA would have been unlikely to 
detect the variation. The director said that the batch was sacrificed to stress to employees the 
importance of unswerving adherence to specifications. 
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Eeforced self-regulation, on the other hand, can ensure that in-
ternal compliance groups will not be lightly overruled. Under the 
model proposed by this Article, a compliance director would be re-
quired to report to the relevant regulatory agency any management 
overruling of compliance group directives. A director who neglected 
this duty would be criminally liable. Such a provision would be the 
strongest method16 of ensuring that compliance unit recommenda-
tions would be followed by management. Companies that regularly 
ignored such directives would fall under the regulatory agency's spe-
cial scrutiny. The agency could concentrate its limited prosecutorial 
resources on companies that continually and irresponsibly disre-
garded compliance group recommendations. Enforced self-regula-
tion thus combines the versatility and flexibility of voluntary self-
regulation, but avoids many of the inherent weaknesses of 
voluntarism. 
B. TheModel 
The concept of enforced self-regulation is a response both to the 
delay, 17 red tape, 18 costs, 19 and stultification of innovation20 that can 
result from imposing detailed government regulations on business, 
and to the naivete of trusting companies to regulate themselves.21 
Under enforced self-regulation, the government would compel each 
company to write a set of rules tailored to the unique set of contin-
gencies facing that firm. A regulatory agency would either approve 
these rules or send them back for revision if they were insufficiently 
stringent. At this stage in the process, citizens' groups and other in-
terested parties would be encouraged to comment on the proposed 
16. Other, weaker, reporting options exist. The compliance group could be statutorily 
mandated to report instances of management overruling to the board of directors or to an 
audit committee of outside directors. 
17. See, e.g., M. WEIDENBAUM, THE FUTURE OF BUSINESS REGULATION (1979); Alexan-
der, It's Roundup Time far the Runaway Regulators, FORTUNE, Dec. 3, 1979, at 12(b). 
18. One author, after pointing out that 786 million hours a year are spent in filling out 
forms to meet U.S. government reporting requirements, suggested that regulatory agencies 
have a "paperwork budget," whereby they submit each year an estimate of the person-hours of 
reporting they will impose on the private sector. Neustadt, The Administration's Regulatol)' 
Reform Program: An Overview, 32 ADMIN. L. REv. 157 (1980). 
19. One estimate placed the costs of regulating American business in 1979 at $4.8 billion. 
The costs to industry for complying with regulations was estimated to be nearly $100 billion. 
M. WEIDENBAUM, supra note 17, at 22-23. 
20. See generally D. SCHWARTZMAN, INNOVATION IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 
(1976); Wardell, The Impact of Regulation on New .Drug .Development, in IssuES IN PHARMA· 
CEUTICAL ECONOMICS 145 (R. Chien ed. 1979); Stewart, Regulation, Innovation, and Adminis• 
tratiYe Law: A Conceptual Framework, 69 CALIF. L. REv. 1256 (1981). 
21. See R. CRANSTON, CONSUMERS AND THE LAW 61-64 (1979). 
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rules.22 Rather than having governmental inspectors enforce the 
rules, most enforcement duties and costs would be internalized by 
the company, which would be required to establish its own in-
dependent inspectorial group. The primary function of governmen-
tal inspectors would be to ensure the independence of this internal 
compliance group and to audit its efficiency and toughness. Such 
audits would pay particular attention to the number of violators who 
had been disciplined by each company.23 Naturally, old-style direct 
government monitoring would still be necessary for firms too small 
to afford their own compliance group. ·, 
Governmental involvement would not stop at monitoring. Viola-
tions of the privately written and publicly ratified rules would be 
punishable· by law. This aspect of the enforced self-regulation 
model, while perhaps sounding radical, is actually not as extreme as 
it first might seem. Regulatory agencies would not ratify private 
rules unless the regulations were consonant with legislatively enacted 
minimum standards.24 
22. Citizen participation in the rulemaking process, under the aegis of the Administrative 
Procedures Act, is a current feature of the direct governmental regulation process. See 5 
U.S.C. §§ 553-557 (1976). Public input can be either in the form of comments submitted to an 
agency or hearing testimony. This Article advocates retention of such a feature in a system of 
enforced self-regulation. There are, however, costs involved, especially in the delays that can 
be expected in receiving and assessing public input. q: Noll, Breaking Out of the Regulatory 
Dilemma: Alternatives lo the Sterile Choice, 51 IND. L.J. 686, 687 (1976) (noting that in 1973, 
the Atomic Energy Commission took an average six months to approve nuclear power plant 
construction permits when no one but the applicant participated in the process; the average 
delay was 29 months when an intervenor was granted full standing). 
23. This would include a statistical monitoring of the relative frequency with which sanc-
tions of different severity ( dismissal, demotion, fine, suspension of bonus, referral for criminal 
prosecution) were imposed by each company. 
24. To say that rules would be rejected if they failed to meet a minimum standard is not to 
say that the goal of the approval process ought to be standards as uniform as possible. 
It can be argued that striving for uniformity of standards under enforced self-regulation 
would not be desirable. Viscusi and Zeckhauser, in Optimal Standards with Incomplete En-
forcement, 27 PUB. POLY. 437 (1979), have developed the following persuasive rationale for 
nonuniformity. People normally assume that the higher the standards set by government for 
pollution, safety, and the like, the better will be industry's performance in meeting these crite-
ria. Viscusi and Zeckhauser show formally that this is not the case. It is not so because when-
ever a standard is set, some firms will decide that the costs of compliance with it are greater 
than the costs of noncompliance (the probability of detection multiplied by the costs if de-
tected). As standards are made more stringent, the costs of compliance increase steeply while 
the costs of noncompliance remain more or less constant. Hence, as standards become more 
stringent, the performance of firms that comply improves, but additional firms choose to risk 
penalties for noncompliance. Viscusi and Zeckhauser thus demonstrate that at some point, 
further tightening of a standard may lower overall performance. But this point will be differ-
ent for different types of firms. For firms with enormous sunk costs in old plants, the costs of 
compliance will be greater than for firms about to construct their factories. 
Because of economies of scale in pollution control, the point at which further tightening of 
standards will increase the output of pollution may be higher for large firms than for small 
ones. In other words, the environment and the public may be better protected by nonuniform 
standards. Hence, nonuniformity under enforced self-regulation could be an advantage. More 
stringent rules could be demanded of firms with lower compliance costs. In some ways, EPA 
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There are a number of ways that a legislature could frame broad 
statements that were not at the same time platitudinous. Consider, 
for example, an act to set guidelines for the Federal Mine Safety and 
Health Administration to follow in approving rules written by coal 
companies. The Act might recognize in its preamble that the mini-
mum level of safety guaranteed_ by the Federal Coal Mine Safety 
and Health Act of 1977 was unsatisfactorily low and instruct the Ad-
ministration not to approve any corporate safety rules that do not 
guarantee better safety performance than that ensured by the 1977 
Act. Recognizing that. American coal miners are three times more 
likely than British miners to be killed at work,25 the Act might fur-
ther instruct the Administration not to accept the existing "state of 
the art" in safety standards. As a third option,26 the Administration 
could be directed to structure its approval process so as to halve coal 
mine fatality and injury rates by a certain year. 
The government need not, moreover, adopt this performance tar-
get approach to setting overarching standards. In empowering the 
Securities and Exchange Commission to ratify accounting rules for 
individual companies, for example, Congress might ijst a number of 
criteria that all sets of accounting rules must satisfy. For environ-
mental rulemaking, the legislature might define a level of ecological 
threat that is intolerable under all circumstances. The standards 
could even specify a range of cost-benefit or cost-effectiveness ratios 
for proposed rules. These examples are not presented to evaluate the 
many ways in which the ultimate authority of the legislature might 
limit private rulemaking; they are presented only to show that such 
already accepts this principle by requiring more stringent emission controls on new 
automobiles than on those already on the road, and by requiring pollution control technology 
to be installed in new plants, controls not demanded of old ones. Theoretically, enforced self• 
regulation makes possible nonuniform optimal standards which would give greater protection 
than any (stricter or more lenient) uniform standard. 
25. The most recent comparable statistics are for "fatalities per thousand employed" in 
underground mining in 1974. The British fatality rate was 0.19 compared with 0.75 for the 
United States. Lewis-Beck & Alford, Can Government Regulate Sqftty? The Coal Mine Exam-
ple, 14 AM. PoL. Ser. REv. 745, 755 n.7 (1980). 
26. Other possible approaches exist. For example, the preamble to the standards might 
draw attention to the variable performance of different companies to give broad guidance. 
Westmoreland Coal was found by the President's Commission on Coal to have an injury rate 
of 21 lost workday cases per 200,000 hours in its 29 underground min~. In contrast, United 
States Steel maintained an injury rate of3 in its 28 underground mines'. Five of the largest 20 
coal producers maintained rates lower than 6 lost workday injuries per 200,000 work hours. 
THE PRESIDENTS COMMISSION ON COAL, STAFF REPoRT: THE ACCEYrABLE REPLACEMENT 
OF IMPORTED OIL WITH COAL 42 (1980). Hence, the legislation could point to the safety per-
formance of these five companies as a more appropriate yardstick: The regulatory agency 
would be instructed to satisfy itself that company rules, and the enforcement of them, were 
sufficiently stringent to cause it to expect an average atµunment of fewer than 6 lost workday 
injuries per 200,000 work hours. 
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authority can be exercised in a variety of ways, depending on the 
circumstances of the regulated industry. 
C. An Illustration: Regulating Corporate Accounting Standards 
To illustrate the advantages of enforced self-regulation, let us ex-
amine the problems inherent in regulating one important aspect of 
business practice - corporate accounting. Recognizing that compa-
nies can use misleading accounting practices and conceal their assets 
to evade taxes, most nations provide for the prosecution of firms that 
fail to report ''true and fair" accounts or to use "accepted accounting 
standards."27 To call such bland admonishments "standards" is to 
stretch meaning. Their very amorphousness hinders prosecution. 
Defendant corporations have little difficulty in finding eminent ac-
counting experts to pronounce their practices professionally accepta-
ble because every accountant has a different conception of what is 
"true and fair" or what constitutes an "accepted accounting 
standard."28 
Unhappy prosecutors can appeal to the legislature for more 
tightly defined standards, but this may lead to overspecification. No 
single set of detailed government-imposed standards will satisfy the 
efficiency requirements of backyard businesses and· transnational 
corporations, banks and manufacturers, or holding companies and 
operating concerns. A company's accounts are a vital tool in evalu-
ating investments and in making other management decisions. Ac-
counts made too subservient to public purposes will be less efficient 
for private purposes. When required to develop standards to govern 
accounts, therefore, legislatures around the world have generally 
opted for the unenforceability of blandness rather than for the ineffi-
ciency of overspecification. 29 · 
How can enforced self-regulation resolve this dilemma? Each 
company would be required to write its own accounting rules. These 
rules should enable the company to meet its operational require-
ments while ensuring public accountability and acceptable compara-
bility with the accounts of othe.r companies. Once these rules had 
been ratified by the appropriate agency and made available to inves-
tors, any yiolation 9f them would, by definition, constitute an unac-
ceptable accounting practice and be punishable by law. By tyip.g the 
specificity of the rules to the unique circumstances of the company 
27. See International Standards of Accounting and Reporting, 4 U.N. Commission on 
Transnational Corporations (Agenda Item 9(b)), U.N. Doc. E/C.10/33 (1977). 
28. See A. BRILOFF, UNACCOUNTABLE ACCOUNTING 6 (1972). 
29. See International Standards, supra note 27. 
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for which they were written, fairness in accounts would be rendered 
enforceable. Specificity can replace blandness without the over-
specification inherent in universalistic standards. In addition to the 
familiar practice of holding outside audits, internal audit groups 
would be mandated. Enforced self-regulation might therefore pro-
duce simple specific rules which would make possible both more effi-
cient, comparable accounting and easier conviction of violators. 
II. STRENGTHS OF THE ENFORCED SELF-REGULATION MODEL 
A. Rules Would Be Tailored To Match the Company 
An efficient system of corporate regulation would acknowledge 
the social risks and social benefits associated with the activities of 
each regulated company and provide rules appropriate to those char-
acteristics. Under direct governmental regulation, such adaptability 
over the wide spectrum of business types and sizes is impossible. 
Government has responded to this problem in two radically different 
ways: It has either tried to obtain specificity by generating rules that 
are gargantuan in length and complexity, or written rules for the 
lowest common denominator of proscribed behavior, as exemplified 
by the bland platitudes of corporate accounting standards.Jo The re-
sulting universalistic rules often impose unnecessary strictures. on 
some companies and overly lax restrictions on others. Regulations 
mandating a certain hazard-reducing technology, while forcing less 
responsible companies to upgrade to this standard, can also cause 
industry leaders to adopt this fix when, left to their own devices, they 
would have installed a technology superior in both hazard reduction 
and economy of scale.JI Rules that strive for universal applicability 
cannot avoid some particularistic irrationality.J2 
Legal institutions are designed to be stable and predictable, while 
economic entities ideally are rapidly adaptable to changing 
economic and technological trends. Universalistic laws cannot be 
quickly altered to reflect changing events lest some critical circum-
stance be ignored among the infinite array of possible conditions to 
which the rules might be applied. But enforced self-regulation is by 
30. See text at notes 27-28 supra. 
31. Executives of the companies that are leaders in quality control and toxicological meth• 
odology in the pharmaceutical industry have complained to me that the FDA's Good Manu-
facturing Practices and Good Laboratory Practices regulations at times forced them to adopt 
what they considered second-best control techniques. 
32. For an account of how the national imposition of a particular pollution abatement 
technology resulted in some companies' switching to high sulfur coal, so that their aggregate 
output of pollution actually increased, see Ackerman & Hassler, Beyond the New .Deal: Coal 
and the Clean Air Act, 89 YALE J,.J. 1466 (1980). 
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definition tailored to the particular needs and functions of each cor-
poration.33 The rules written need relate only to a limited set of eco-
nomic and structural circumstances rather than to a vast, incoherent 
range of business activities. The environmental protection regula-
tions to be followed by a self-employed chemicals wholesaler, for 
example, need not be as complex as those governing a Dow or a 
duPont. Because rules under a system of enforced self-regulation are 
particularistic, an agency charged with approving those rules need 
not account for all of the loophole-opening strategies used by differ-
ent companies to duck their regulatory responsibilities. 34 
In short, under enforced self-regulation, rules could be both sim-
pler and have greater specificity of meaning. The dangers of com-
plexity and blandness are easily avoided when rules relate to a finite 
and known set of circumstances rather than to an infinite and un-
knowable range of business activities. 
B. Rules Would Adjust More Quickly to Changing 
Business Environments 
A primary reason for the failure oflaw to control corporate crime 
is that legal institutions are made to last, while economic institutions 
are designed for rapid adaptation to changing economic and techno-
logical realities. Universalistic laws cannot, or at least should not, be 
rushed through lest they are later found to create more problems 
than they solve through having failed to consider some critical cir-
cumstance among the infinite array of possible conditions to which 
they might be applied. 
Because particularistic rules have less profound ramifications 
than universalistic rules, they can be tinkered with more frequently. 
When a new threat is perceived to the public interest (e.g., research 
discovers a new industrial carcinogen), years of delay can be ex-
pected as universalistic rules are drafted and redrafted to meet objec-
tions from the disparate types of industries which would be 
differentially affected by the proposed rule. 35 Lengthy consideration 
33. See Fisse, The Social Polic,y of Corporate Criminal Responsibility, 6 ADEL. L. REv. 382-
85 (1978), for a discussion of various reasons why internal rulemaking presents advantages in 
simplicity and enforceability over external rulemaking. See also Amsterdam, Perspectives on 
the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 417-39 (1974), in which Prof. Amsterdam ar-
gues that rules of conduct written by police departments themselves are likely to be more 
refined than rules conferred externally because thay are drawn up and modified by people in 
touch with the day-to-day realities of implementation. 
34. For example, legislation rushed through to close one loophole might be used by sharp 
corporate attorneys to justify a principle which enables them to open a new .loophole 
elsewhere. 
35. The classic illustration of such regulatory paralysis is the National Highway Traffic 
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must be given to the now almost inevitable pleas by some firms that 
they would be forced out of business by the new rules. In contrast, 
under enforced self-regulation, as immediately as the threat was per-
ceived, all companies would be required to write new, more stringent 
rules to meet the threat. Of course, companies which feared the 
financial repercussions of the new controls could be expected to 
write rules insufficiently stringent to satisfy government require-
ments. A lengthy process of redrafting and negotiation would com-
mence with those firms. But while this was going on, the majority of 
firms which were willing and able to introduce satisfactory protec-
tions would be following their new rules. Under traditional regula-
tion, these firms would be waiting until the final form of the 
regulations was decided before investing in new controls. Even 
those firms which chose to write rules insufficiently stringent might · 
be giving improved protection during the negotiating period if they 
were following their improved, but still inadequate, standards. 
Probably the most important factor enabling particularistic rules 
to be adjusted more rapidly is that precedent would not be as impor-
tant as it is under universalism. A pharmaceutical company which 
abandoned a quality control test iI1- favor of a completely new, more 
effective, in-process approach to building in quality could be permit-
ted to immediately change its rules to accommodate this innovation 
under enforced self-regulation. Under traditional regulation, in con-
trast, the regulatory agency would be slow in deliberating whether 
allowing this company to abandon the old test would lead to a flood 
of demands from other concerns that they too be allowed to do away 
with it (even though they had not introduced any alternative con-
trols). The regulatory agency would have to consider whether any 
pending court cases turning on the validity of the old rule might be 
lost if the defendants could show that the agency had selectively 
waived the rule. Under enforced self-regulation, where companies 
are prosecuted only for violations of their own rules, this kind of 
precedent would not be an issue. 
C. Regulatory Innovation Would Be Fostered 
It has already been implied that governments freed of anxiety 
over allowing dangerous precedents would be more permissive of 
radical new approaches to the control of harmful practices or 
Safety Administration, established in 1966 to set standards. By 1981, only two had been estab-
lished: one in 1972 on side impacts, and another in 1977 on gasoline tank safety. See DeGe-
orge, Ethical Responsibilities of Engineers in Large Organizations: The Pinto Care, l Bus. & 
PR.OF. ETHICS 9 (1981). 
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processes. Regulations written in 1982 will tend to ossify control 
techniques, be they environmental or financial, at the state of the art 
as of 1982. Enforced self-regulation, in comparison, would tap the 
managerial genius within top corporations to design custom-made 
regulatory systems. At all times it would be possible for cheaper and 
more.effective modes of contrQl to emerge. Ultimately, more effec-
tive approaches to such problems as reducing pollution and assuring 
product and workplace safety will result from depending on the cre-
ative expertise of the private sector, rather than on the more limited 
reservoir of talent in the bureaucracy. If innovation is encouraged, 
however, there is also a price to be paid; some technological and 
managerial "improvements" will prove less effective than existing 
techniques. A combination of regulatory vigilance and civil liability 
for damages to victims would have to be counted on to control the 
excesses of experimentation. 
D. Rules Would Be More Comprehensive in Their Coverage 
Three empirical studies36 of internal rulemaking and enforce-
ment in fifty large companies have convinced me that internal corpo-
rate rules invariably cover a much wider range of industrial hazards 
and corporate abuses than do governmental regulations. While large 
companies manage to write. rules regulating a substantial proportion 
of the most serious harms or wrongs that could occur in their busi-
ness, governments simply do not. They fail because they lack the 
time, research resources, and political will necessary to build con-
sensus around a comprehensive set of rules. Instead of dealing 
forthrightly with their failure to achieve broad regulatory coverage, 
governments trust firms to regulate themselves voluntarily under the 
tens of thousands of nongovernmental standards written by trade as-
sociations, professional and technical societies, and similar bodies.37 
By giving public recognition to private corporate rules, enforced self-
regulation could extend the law to cover a wider range of highly 
dangerous practices. 
The failure of government consensus-building to reconcile con-
flicts over rules can also subject companies to the demands of two 
agencies wit:4 conflicting goals. This can be demonstrated by the di-
36. The studies will be published as J. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 6 (forthcoming); J. 
BRAITHWAITE, COST-EFFECTIVE BUSINESS REGULATION (1981); B. FISSE & J. BRAITHWAITE, 
supra note 6 (forthcoming). • 
37. See Hamilton, Tlte Role of Nongovernmental Standards in tlte .Development of· 
Mandatory Federal Standards Affecting Sofety or Health, 56 TEXAS L. R.Ev. 1329 (1978); Page, 
Self Regulation and Codes of Practice, 1. Bus. L., Jan. 1980, at 24. 
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lemma faced by some Australian meat packing houses. The compa-
nies are trapped in a dispute over how often floors should be washed. 
Health authorities, concerned only with the cleanliness of the food 
being processed, require regular wash-downs. Occupational safety 
officials, worried about the safety of workers carrying sharp instru-
ments on wet floors, want the surfaces kept dry. While the agencies 
bicker over their regulatory authority, the resulting stalemate bene-
fits neither the consuming public nor workers. Under enforced self-
regulation, each slaughterhouse could be given wide discretion to 
write (in consultation with employee representatives) its own floor-
washing rules. Though the respective agencies could still disagree on 
the relative importance of dry floors versus clean floors, less political 
will would be required to grant the company discretion to suggest 
their own way out of the stalemate than would be needed to force 
consensus between the agencies. As mentioned above, regulatory 
agencies at present have no choice but to vigilantly guard against 
compromises which set dangerous precedents; under enforced self-
regulation they can be more flexible because precedents will not 
come back to haunt them. In too many areas, necessary regulations 
gather dust in the "too-hard" basket because of the consensus-build-
ing demands of the direct regulation model. 
E. Companies Would Be More Committed 
to Rules They Wrote 
As John Kenneth Galbraith has noted, "[n]othing in American 
business attitudes is so iniquitous as government interference in the 
internal affairs of the corporation."38 If business is responsible for 
writing and enforcing its own code of conduct, the notion of regula-
tion may become more palatable. 
Many corporations are currently alienated from a sense of social 
responsibility. In highly regulated industries, there can be an atti-
tude of unconcern about corporate abuses that government inspec-
tors do not discover. A senior Australian executive of an 
international drug company, for example, claimed that "it is the re-
sponsibility of the Health Department to work out whether research 
results have been cheated on. Maybe ifwe do fudge some result, it's 
the job of the Health Department to find that out. It's not our re-
sponsibility. That's their job." Or, to quote an American 
counterpart: 
Often our people use the FDA to get out of making a decision them-
38. J.K. GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 77 (1967) (emphasis in original), 
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selves on a drug. We find it very hard to reach consensus among our-
selves on the safety of a product and often there are strong 
disagreements among us. So sometimes we get out of making our own 
decision by putting it to the FDA and letting them decide for us.39 
Irresponsible companies are frequently pleased to hand over in-
complete facts to facilitate the government's regulatory decision; if 
the agency gives them a green light, they delightedly claim, "It's 
within the rules, so let's go ahead." 
Such abdication ofresponsibility could be minimized by the joint 
participation of company and government in a rulemaking program. 
When the company writes the laws it is more difficult for it to ration-
alize illegality by reference to the law's being an ass. Considerable 
evidence indicates, moreover, that participation in a decision-mak-
ing process increases the acceptance and improves the execution of 
the decisions reached.40 As company and government work together 
to design workable rules, mutual suspicions may diminish. Of 
course, commitment to self-generated rules will be less pronounced 
when an agency vetoes the initial rules proposed by a company and 
ultimately approves regulations that the company views as less than 
optimal. 
F. The Confusion and Costs That Flow from Having Two 
Rulebooks (the Government's and the Company's) Would 
Be Reduced 
Under enforced self-regulation, it would be no longer necessary 
for a company to undergo the costs and confusion of having to fol-
low two rulebooks - the government's and its own. This problem is 
particularly acute in transnational subsidiaries, where the host g6v-
ernment's rules may be framed in fundamentally different terms 
from the rules imposed by corporate headquarters. Obviously the 
fusing of corporate and host government rules would rarely be pain-
less; in many situations governments would insist that corporate reg-
ulations be modified to conform to local requirements. But 
governments should concede the validity of totally different ap-
proaches to control developed in other countries. Japanese pharma-
ceutical companies, for example, have adopted an approach to 
toxicology testing for dangerous side-effect~ of drugs that differs rad-
39. Statements made during interviews with the author. 
40. Professor Vroom has reviewed the empirical evidence from organizational research 
showing that, other things being equal, "the participation of individuals or of groups in deci-
sions which affect them appears to be positively related to their acceptance of decisions and to 
the efficiency with which decisions are executed." Vroom, Industrial Social Psychology, in S 
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 196, 237 (G. Lindzey & E. Aronson 2d ed. 1969). 
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ically from the Western toxicology tradition. Enforced self-regula-
tion might permit a Japanese company operating in the United 
States to follow its worldwide drug safety standards instead of West-
ern requirements that are thoroughly incompatible with its corporate 
rules. By allowing the company to preserve the integrity of its total 
quality assurance and safety testing package, enforced self-regula-
tion might better protect the public. 
G. Business Would Bear More of the Costs of Its Own Regulation 
Enforced self-regulation, by placing the principal inspectorial 
burden on internal -compliance groups, also allocates most of the 
costs for such regulation to private industry. This is only equitable. 
If industry profits from its misdeeds, why should it not bear the costs 
of controlling them? Economic efficiency is also furth~red by forcing 
companies to internalize regulatory costs. If such costs are not in-
cluded in the price of its products, the price will not fully reflect the 
social cost of producing it, and the demand for the product will ex-
ceed that which would optimize social utility.41 
H. More Offenders Would Be Caught More Oflen 
In the above section on ''The Theory of Self-Regulation," a vari-
ety of reasons were advanced to explain why self-regulation results 
in broader inspectorial coverage by inspectors , with a greater 
capability for discovering violations.42 Though internal compliance 
groups can be expected to catch more offenders than government 
inspectors, they cannot be counted upon to send the offenders to 
courts of law for prosecution with the frequency which we expect of 
government inspectors. ~easons exist, however, to believe that inter-
nal discipline would not be less effective. 
41. Professor Mishan has explained the economic rationale for J,Daking firms assume the 
burden of externalities: 
The operations of firms, or the doings of ordinary people, frequently have significant ef-
fects on others of which no account need be taken by the firms, or th~. individuals, respon-
sible for them. Moreover, inasmuch as the benefits conferred and the damages inflicted -
or 'external economies' and 'external diseconomies' respectively - on oilier members of 
society in the process of producing, or using, certain goods do not enter the calculation of 
the market price, one can no longer take it for granted that the market price of a good is 
an index of its marginal value to society. 
. . . It follows that an apparently efficiently working competitive ec;onomy, one in which 
outputs are quickly adjusted so that prices everywhere tend to equal private marginal cost, 
may lead the economy very far indeed from an optimal position as defined. Such an 
optimal position in fact requires that in all sectors production be such that ptjces are equal 
to social marginal cost. 
E. MlsHAN, THE COSTS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 82-83 (1969). 
42. See notes 7-16 supra and accompanying text. 
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1. Offenders 1Vho Were Caught Would .Be Subjected To Internal 
.Discpline In a Larger Proportion ef Cases Than Under 
Traditional Government Regulation 
Under enforced self-regulation, companies with strong records of 
disciplining their employees would be rewarded as showing up well 
in government audits of the toughness of internal compliance sys-
tems; existing public enforcement, in contrast, gives companies in-
centives to cover up and protect their guilty employees. Internal dis-
cipline is in many ways more potent than government prosecution 
because internal enforcers <l:o not have to surmount the hurdle of 
proof beyond reasonable doubt, and do not have to cut through a 
conspiracy of diffused accountability within the organization.43 Cor-
porations in the past have protected their individual members from 
prosecution by presenting a confused picture of the allocation of re-
sponsibility to the outside world. My research on the pharmaceuti-
cal industry concluded, however, that companies have two kinds of 
records: those designed to allocate guilt (for internal purposes), and 
those for obscuring guilt (for presentation to the outside world): 
When companies want clearly defined accountability they can gener-
ally get it. Enforced self-regulation would compel companies to use 
this capability in the public interest. Direct government regulation 
provides disincentives for nominated accountability, because nomi-
nated accountability puts heads on the prosecutor's chopping block; 
enforced self-regulation provides incentives for nominated accounta-
bility because corporations which cannot demonstrate that they are 
conducting their own executions would be singled out for 
inquisition. 
J. It Would .Be Easier For Government Prosecutors To Obtain 
Corporate Crime Convictions 
It has been concluded under sections 11-H and II-I that the 
greatly increased number of discovered violations under enforced 
self-regulation would be regularly the subject of internal disciplinary 
action but rarely of public prosecution. Even though internal com-
pliance groups would not "call the cops" in normal circumstances, 
there are other features of the enforced self-regulation approach 
which would make it reasonable to expect more potent public as well 
as private enforcement. Essentially, there are three reasons for pre-
dicting that more suspects would be convicted under enforced self-
regulation than under direct regulation. 
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Because bland and meaningless rules ( e.g. that accounts be 
'true and fair') would be replaced by precise and particu-
laristic rules,44 acquittals would be more difficult to secure 
by appeal to the vagaries of the wording. 
Universalistic rulemaking tends to complexity because the 
rules must evolve to deal with the infinity of circumstances 
encountered throughout the entire economy. The more 
complex the law becomes, the more will powerful organiza-
tions exploit that complexity by finding loopholes, pro-
tracting proceedings and otherwise evading the spirit of the 
law.45 Under simple particularistic rules, this capacity of 
company lawyers to exploit complexity would be 
diminished. 
In cases where the recommendations of the internal com-
pliance group were defied this fact would be communicated 
to the regulatory agency. Their reports would then be pow-
erful ammunition for the prosecutor to put before the 
court. The contents of the compliance group report would 
also direct the prosecutor to the most valuable insiders to 
subpoena. 
K. Compliance Would Become the Path of Least 
Corporate Resistance 
Requiring compliance directors to report management refusals to 
heed their recommendations would pressure executives to comply 
with those recommendations. For most offenses, the cost of yielding 
to the compliance director would be less than the costs of fighting the 
investigation, prosecution, and adverse publicity that would almost 
certainly follow rejection of the compliance group's recommenda-
tions.46 And if the agency succeeded in its action, the courts would 
44. See notes 33 & 34 supra and accompanying text. 
45. The more complex the web of law becomes, the more possible it is for company law-
yers to use the doctrines implicit in one part of the law as a justification for actions that evade 
other parts of the same body of law. For a general discussion of rule complexity and its ex-
ploitation, see Sutton & Wild, Corporate Crime and Social Structure, in Two FACES OF DEVI· 
ANCE 177 (P. Wilson & J. Braithwaite eds. 1978); Braithwaite, Inegalitarian Consequences oj" 
Egalitarian Reforms to Control Corporate Crime, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1127, 1136-40 (1980). 
46. Consider, for example, one of the most significant environmental prosecutions in the 
United States - the Kepone water pollution case against Allied Chemical. If an internal 
compliance group had been in place, had told top management about the violations, and had 
threatened to report them to the EPA, there can be little doubt that remedial action would 
have been taken. Kepone earned its maker only $600,000 in profits a year; its unlawful disper-
sal into the James River ultimately cost Allied almost $30 million in fines, legal fees, settle-
ments, and voluntary restitutive efforts. See B. F1ssE & J. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 6, 
The other reason that an enforced self-regulation scheme would have resulted in immedi-
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compel the company to comply with the recommendations originally 
suggested by the compliance unit. Large corporations have an al-
most obsessive desire to prevent their dirty linen from being washed 
in public.47 Even when top management believes that it could pre-
vail in court, it might still yield to the compliance group rather than 
display a rift between the two sections of the company in full view of 
shareholders, financial institutions, and other key reference groups. 
On the debit side, then, the compliance directors' statutory obliga-
tion to report a failure to rectify could conceivably give them so 
much clout as to lead to an "over-compliance" whereby manage-
ment allowed itself to be pushed further than the rules ever intended. 
III. INCIPIENT MANIFESTATIONS OF THE ENFORCED SELF-
REGULATION MODEL 
Two key elements underlie the enforced self-regulation concept: 
(a) public enforcement of privately written rules; and (b) publicly 
mandated and publicly monitored private enforcement of those 
rules. Each element already exists in a variety of regulatory areas, 
but there is no manifestation of both in a comprehensive enforced 
self-regulation scheme. 
Every country in the world publicly enforces private rules in its 
regulation of civil aviation safety.48 Before an airline flies a new 
route, the altitude of its approaches, the flight path, survival equip-
ment to be carried on board, and other operating procedures must be 
approved by the national civil aviation authority concerned. The 
rules are not universal but are tailor-made for the particular flight; 
the company writes them, and the government ratifies them and 
ate rectification is that top management only became aware of the violations late in the game. 
Allied's chief executive officer, for example, did not know so much as what Kepone was until 
the scandal broke. (Information based on private interview data). This points up an addi-
tional reason why middle managers would submit to the compliance director: Once a regula-
tory agency had co=enced a prosecution, with its attendant public disclosure, the attention 
of top management would be drawn to those middle-level executives. Their jobs would not 
long be secure. For a discussion of the greater costs involved in publicly fighting cases rather 
than quietly settling (even when the corporation is innocent), see ~offee, Corporate Punish-
ment, supra note 4, at 402-03. 
41. See generally B. FISSE & J. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 6; Fisse, The Use of Publicity as a 
Criminal Sanction Against Business Corporations, 8 MELB. U. L. REv. 107 (1971). 
48. On the regulation of civil aviation, see, e.g., AVIATION STATISTICS CENTRE, TRANSP. & 
PUB. UTIL. DIV., STATISTICS CANADA, AVIATION IN CANADA 1971, at 34-37 (1972); BUSINESS 
AND DEFENSE SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, WORLD SURVEY OF 
CIVIL AVIATION: CONTINENTAL EUROPE AND IRELAND (1965); D. HOCKING & C. liADDON-
CAVE, AIR TRANSPORT IN AUSTRALIA 75 (1951). The violation of such privately written and 
publicly ratified rules concerning minimum safe altitudes was a major issue in the inquiry into 
the crash of an Air New Zealand plane with 257 people aboard in Antarctica. See 'Incompe-
tent Administrative Procedures' Cited in Crash Report, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., July 6, 
1981, at 34. 
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punishes deviation from their strictures. Violations of such rules in 
Australia, for example, are punishable by imprisonment as well as 
by fines or license revocation.49 
Perhaps the most highly developed version of this aspect of en-
forced self-regulation can be found in the Federal Mine Safety and 
Health Act of 1977.50 Section IOI(c) of the Act provides: 
Upon petition by the operator or the representative of miners, the Sec-
retary may modify the application of any mandatory safety standard to 
a coal or other mine if the Secretary determines that an alternative 
method of achieving the result of such standard exists which will at all 
times guarantee no less than the same measure of protection afforded 
the miners of such mine by such standard, or that the application of 
such standard to such mine will result in a diminution of safety to the 
miners in such mine.51 
Since 1977, about 600 petitions for modification (some of them in-
volving packages of standards) have been granted by the Mine 
Safety and Health Administration. In a few instances, civil fines 
have been assessed against companies that violated the particularis-
tic standards approved under a petition for modification. However, 
officials believe that citations for such violations are rare because of 
the companies' commitment to rules that they have sought them-
selves. The program is not without regulatory cost; each petition 
consumes roughly three-person days for investigation and 
approval.52 
The Mine Safety and Health Administration regulations53 also 
permit mine operators to submit their own plans for ventilation54 
and dust control,55 and roof support56 for the agency's approval. The 
latter is particularly significant since roof falls are the leading cause 
of fatal accidents in mines.57 In setting down the criteria to be fol-
lowed in approving roof control plans, the regulations separately de-
49. See 1981 Aust!. Stat. R., §§ 212-14, 312 (as amended Sept. 4, 1981) (regulations under 
the Air Navigation Act, 1920-74) l Acrs. AUSTL. P. 143. 
50. 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-23, 824-902, 921-924, 925-34, 936-60 (Supp. I 1977, Supp. II 1978 & 
Supp. III 1979) (as amended). 
51. Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-164, § IOI(c), 91 Stat. 
1294 (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 8II(c) (Supp. I 1977)). 
52. Information gleaned from interviews conducted by the author with mine safety 
officials. 
53. 30 C.F.R. §§ 70.1-90.301 (1981). 
54. 30 C.F.R. § 75.300-.330-1 (1981). 
55. 30 C.F.R. § 75.400-.404 (1981). 
56. 30 C.F.R. § 75.200-.205 (1981). 
57. U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, ANNUAL RE-
PORT AND ACHIEVEMENTS (pt. I) 27 (1978). 
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fine standards for seven different types of roof support techniques. 58 
Additionally, mine owners are free to devise their own unique roof 
control plans.59 These regulations constitute an impressive example 
of how firm criteria to limit administrative discretion can be 
designed in the face of a variety of technologies, the appropriateness 
of which depends on the circumstances of a particular mine. 
Since December 1979, companies have been criminally convicted 
in several cases that turned in part on deviations from approved roof 
control plans. 60 In one of these cases, a mine official of the 
Vanhoose Coal Company was sentenced to sixty days imprisonment 
for failing to comply with a roof control plan that the Labor Depart-
ment had approved.61 This offense was responsible for a roof fall in 
which one Vanhoose miner died and another was injured. It is to the 
best of my knowledge the only case in which an executive has been 
imprisoned for noncompliance with privately written, publicly rati-
fied rules. 
The appropriateness of enforced self-regulation to coal mine 
safety is patent. As one coal mining official suggested: "The last 
four major disasters in this country could be attributed to a weak 
plan." While violations of specific standards were a problem, the 
fundamental cause of the disasters was poor execution of a total 
safety plan. Enforced self-regulation would focus attention on the 
overall plan, and not simply on the quality of single standards. 
Some of the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) enforce-
ment activities also approach the enforced self-regulation model. In-
deed, in one important respect, the agency has gone beyond the 
approach envisaged by this Article. The Clean Water Act62 autho-
rizes civil penalties of $5000 per day for deviations from privately 
written oil spillage rules that have not been publicly rati:fi.ed.63 The 
58. The categories of roof support plans are: full roof bolting, 30 C.F.R. § 75.200-07; con-
ventional roof control, 30 C.F.R. § 75.200-08; combination roof control, 30 C.F.R. § 75.200-09; 
spot roof bolting, 30 C.F.R. § 75.200-11; special roof control, 30 C.F.R. § 75.200-12; and tem-
porary support, 30 C.F.R. § 75.200-13: 
59. Roof control plans which do not conform to these criteria [see note 58 supra] may be 
approved providing the operator can satisfy the District Manager that the resultant roof 
conditions will provide no less than the same measure of protection to the miners. 
30 C.F.R. § 75.200-06 (1981). 
60. United States v. Wyatt, CR 81-00029 (W.D. Va. plea entered Apr. 29, 1981); United 
States v. Vanhoose Coal Co. Inc. No. l Mine, CR 81-4 (E.D. Ky.plea entered Apr. 15, 1981); 
United States v. United Castle Coal Co. No. 1 Mine, CR 80-00093 (W.D. Va.plea entered Apr. 
9, 1981); United States v. J. & P. Coal Co., CR 80-0060 (W.D. Va.plea entered Sept. 8, 1980). 
61. United States v. Vanhoose Coal Co. No. l Mine, No. 81-4 (E.D. Ky.plea entered Apr. 
15, 1981). 
62. Codified in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C. (1976). 
63. 40 C.F.R. § 114.1 (1981). 
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EPA regulations require companies involved in the production, dis-
tribution, or storage of oil to prepare a Spill Prevention Control or 
Countermeasure Plan. 64 The companies must follow agency guide-
lines in preparing the plan, but their plans are reviewed by the EPA 
only if a spill actually occurs. In normal circumstances, the plan 
need only be certified by a Professional Engineer, who must attest 
that the plan accords with good engineering practices. 65 
In another area of EPA regulation, the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit has upheld civil penalties imposed on the Chrysler Corporation 
for violating the terms of a certificate of conformity with emission 
controls under the Clean Air Act. 66 The certificate is, in effect, a 
license to sell vehicles issued after approval of an application listing 
vehicle parameters and specifications that reasonably may be ex-
pected to affect emissions. Chrysler was penalized for violating some 
of these specifications. The corporation appealed, claiming that re-
gardless of the breach of the certificate's terms, the emissions of its 
• vehicles remained within federal standards. In finding against the 
corporation, the court upheld an important principle: The integrity 
of particularistic standards must be sustained even when full compli-
ance with them proved unnecessary to attain the overarching stan-
dards that gave them birth. 
In short, then, there are already powerful examples of public en-
forcement of privately written rules. But the full enforced self-regu-
lation model requires more; it also mandates governmentally 
monitored internal enforcement of the internally written rules. The 
closest incipient approximation is governmentally monitored inter-
nal enforcement of externally written regulations. The leading illus-
tration is the enforcement of Good Laboratory Practices (GLP) rules 
imposed on pharmaceutical companies by the Food and Drug 
Administration. 
GLPs were first promulgated in 197867 after it was alleged that 
pharmaceutical companies replaced animals that developed un-
healthy conditions during drug-testing experiments. The regulations 
seek to render fraud more difficult by requiring strict record keep-
ing68 and unswerving adherence to scientific protocols.69 Most inter-
estingly, the GLPs require each drug testing laboratory to have a 
64. 40 C.F.R. § 112.1-07 (1981). 
65. 40 C.F.R. § 112.3(d) (1981). The criteria can be found in 40 C.F.R. § 112.7 (1981), 
66. United States v. Chrysler Corp., 591 F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
61. See 43 Fed. Reg. 60,013 (1978). 
68. 21 C.F.R. § 58.185-.195 (1981). 
69. 21 C.F.R. § 58.120-.130 (1981). 
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Quality Assurance Unit (QA(J) that acts as an internal compliance 
policeman.70 This feature was designed to shift the financial burden 
of regulation from government to the companies. Quality Assur-
ance Unit status reports must routinely be placed before the study 
director and management of the company.71 This ensures that man-
agement can not plead ignorance when it fails to act on reports of 
violations. 'If management does not know about the discovered vio-
lations, the company is guilty of an offense for not knowing. The 
regulations thus enforce a self-regulatory mechanism to prevent un-
derlings from .filtering bad news before it reaches responsible ears.72 
The decision to throw the major burden of regulation onto an 
internal QAU raised some thorny issues, however. Industry argued 
that if QA Us had to make their findings available to the FDA, then 
their effectiveness as a management tool to ensure the quality of re-
search would be undermined. A QAU which knew that its com-
ments would be read by FDA officials (and by consumer groups, 
which could get the comments from the FDA under the Freedom of 
Information Act) would be less than frank in its reports to manage-
ment. QAU reports would become a public relations function of the 
company rather than a compliance function. The FDA was per-
suaded by this argument and decided that, as a matter of administra-
tive policy, inspectors would not request reports of findings and 
problems uncovered by the QAU or records of corrective actions rec-
ommended and taken.73 FDA inspectors still audit the QAU to en-
sure that it has effective compliance systems in place and to check 
certain objective compliance criteria. But the records available for 
70. 21 C.F.R. § 58.35 (1981). 
71. 21 C.F.R. § 58.35(b)(4) (1981). 
72. [T]here is a natural tendency for "bad news" of any sort not to rise to the top in an 
organization. A screening process takes place, such that if a company has been touting a 
new drug, and the drug begins "experiencing difficulties" in the lab, lab employees and 
their supervisors just "know'' that information about this is to be passed upward, if at all, 
only in the vaguest terms. If an automobile company has retooled and is geared to pro-
duce 500,000 units of some car, a test driver or his supervisor knows that information 
suggesting that the car turns over too easily is not going to be welcomed "upstairs." 
Worse still, certain sorts of wrongdoing of a more serious sort - for example, price-fixing 
or other criminal activity - is not just screened out casually; it becomes the job of some-
one, perhaps the general counsel, to intercept any such information that could "taint" his 
president or board chairman, divulging his suspicions only in private, if at all. In this 
way, the law not only fails to bring about the necessary internal flow of information, it 
may systematically operate to keep information of wrongdoing away from the very people 
who might best do something about it. 
C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS 45 (1975). 
73. See 43 Fed. Reg. 59,998 (1978). The decision to immunize the reports from FOIA 
atcess was made after members of industry, associations, educational and other groups review-
ing the proposed rules criticized the original plan to provide full access to the QAU report. 43 
Fed. Reg. at 59,998. 
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regular inspection are separated from reports of findings and 
problems and corrective actions recommended. While the latter 
QAU reports are treated as confidential company documents by the 
FDA, this does not prevent a court from requiring the disclosure of 
any report, just as a judge can demand other types of company docu-
ments which are confidential for routine inspectorial purposes. 
In this Article, a different resolution to this very knotty problem 
has been suggested. Under the enforced self-regulation model, the 
routine reports of internal compliance groups would not be available 
to regulatory agencies. However, when the compliance group dis-
covered a violation of law and management decided to continue the 
violation or to ignore a recommendation that the offenders be disci-
. plined, this fact would be put before the agency. The company 
would be granted the privilege of secrecy only so long as it followed 
the advice of its internal compliance group. Unrectified violations 
which were kept secret would not be immune from government pros-
ecution. If these offenses were independently discovered by govern-
ment inspectors they could and should be prosecuted. The retention 
of a limited direct government inspection capacity is important 
under enforced self-regulation to keep internal compliance groups 
on their toes. Nevertheless, governments face an ethical dilemma in 
deciding to treat as confidential compliance group reports that may 
reveal violations of law. But the need for frank reporting of offenses 
by compliance groups, the fact that most offenses would rarely be-
come known to anyone (let alone prosecuted) in the absence of such 
frankness, and the government's retained ability independently to 
investigate and convict, all suggest that the solution to the dilemma 
suggested by this Article is reasonable. 
Government-mandated internal enforcement procedures are 
used in other areas as well. Under the Mine Safety and Health Act 
regulations, specially designated miners conduct pre-shift examina-
tions of the mine for hazards to safety. 74 Pre-shift examiners are re-
quired to record violations of mandatory health and safety standards 
and in fact do so regularly. But in practical terms, they are not ex-
pected systematically to audit the mine operators' compliance with 
the law. Rather, their goal is to check quickly every working section 
of the mine for serious hazards. Inspectorial practice is to check the 
74. Three hours before the beginning of any shift, and before any miner enters a working 
area of the mine, the pre-shift examiner checks the atmosphere, roof supports, conveyers and 
other travelways, and other actual or potential safety hazards. If a hazardous condition is 
discovered, the examiner, a miner himself, posts a "danger'' sign, reports the hazards to a mine 
official, and notes the condition in a book kept at the site for inspection. 30 C.F.R. § 75.303 
(1981). 
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violations recorded in the pre-shift examination book and to cite the 
violation if it still exists but ignore it if it has been rectified. There do 
not seem to have been any prosecutions of pre-shift examiners for 
failure to report serious violations, though this would seem to be the-
oretically possible. Similarly, the Toxic Substance Control Act75 au-
thorizes the Administrator of the EPA to order manufacturers to test 
suspect chemical substances;76 internally to monitor compliance with 
Act procedures, 77 and to indicate proposed quality control proto-
cols. 78 The Administrator can also order revisions of protocols that 
he finds inadequate.79 
Courts and commissions have also imposed monitored internal 
enforcement on single companies. Solomon and Nowak80 have re-
viewed a number of Federal Trade Commission cases in which com-
panies guilty of consumer misrepresentation have been ordered to 
(a) institute certain new policies to prevent a recurrence of the of-
fense, (b) establish an internal monitoring function to ensure compli-
ance with these new policies, and (c) establish a record-keeping 
system for this monitoring so that the FTC could review and verify 
future compliance. Similar interventions have also been common in 
consent decrees negotiated by the SEC.81 The Swedish Market 
Courts and the Market Court in the Australian State of Victoria are 
also empowered to impose special rules on individual companies to 
protect consumers; failure to comply with these particularistic rules 
is a criminal offense. 82 
In addition to monitored internal enforcement of externally im-
posed standards, there is at least one example of monitored internal 
enforcement of unspec!fted standards, as demonstrated by the Fed-
75. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). The inclusion of this example was 
suggested by Stone, The Place of Enterprise Liabih"fy in the Control of Corporate Conduct, 90 
YALE L.J. l, 144 n.167 (1980). 
76. 15 U.S.C. § 2603(a) (1976). 
77. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a)(4) (1976). 
78. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(b)(l) (1976). 
79. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(b)(2)(A) (1976). 
80. See Solomon & Nowak, Managerial Restructuring: Prospects for a New Regulatory 
Tool, 56 NOTRE DAME LAW. 120 (1980). 
81. See Herlihy & Levine, Corporate Crisis: The Overseas Payment Problem, 8 LAW & 
POLY. INTL. Bus. 547, 577-94 (1976); Sommer, The Impact of the SEC on Corporate Gover-
nance, LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBs., Summer 1977, at 115, 127-34; Comment, Corporate Se!f-
Investigations Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 803, 806-11 (1980). 
82. See Duggan, Consumer Redress and the Legal System, in CONSUMER PROTECTION 
LAW AND THEORY 220-21 (A.J. Duggan & L.W. Darvall eds. 1980). For a discussion of con-
sumer protection legislation in American states which approaches this situation, see Bemstine, 
Prosecutorial .Discretion in Consumer Protection .Divisions of Selected State Attorney General 
Offices, 20 How. L.J. 247, 276-77 (1977). 
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eral Communications Commission's interesting solution to the prob-
lem of regulating the broadcast of popular records whose lyrics 
promote illegal drug use. Instead of writing rules to specify what 
constitutes an unacceptable insinuation that drug use is desirable, 
the Commission required broadcasters to ensure that a responsible 
station employee reviewed all questionable records before they were 
aired.83 
These examples serve two useful purposes. First, they illustrate 
that the enforced self-regulation model proposed in this Article is not 
radical; instances of all key elements of the model can be found in 
current enforcement practices. Second, they can provide the raw 
data for much of the empirical research needed to answer troubling 
questions about the model. By studying examples of elements of the 
model in operation, investigators may be able to evaluate its efficacy 
and to increase its effectiveness and practicality. 
IV. WEAKNESSES OF THE ENFORCED SELF-REGULATION MODEL 
A. Regulatory Agencies Would Bear Costs of Approving a Vastly 
Increased Number of Rules Each Year 
The actual process of rulemaking involves considerable costs. It 
might be objected that what is being suggested is a multiplication of 
these costs by the number of companies which participate in an en-
forced self-regulation scheme. Such an objection must be scruti-
nized carefully. Government rulemaking is at present such an 
agonizing and costly process primarily because of the difficulties of 
writing universalistic rules which do not hinder efficiency. Particu-
laristic rulemaking would be cheaper because the environmental 
contingencies to be considered would be finite rather than infinite. 
The regulatory agency would no longer have to undertake such steps 
as playing simulation games to assess how di.ff erent industries might 
use the same set of rules to open di.ff erent loopholes. A rule to close 
a gap for one company opens a loophole for another. Every word in 
every regulation must be carefully vetted lest the agency leave itself 
open to new and dangerous precedents. As argued above, precedent 
would not be a worry with particularistic rulemaking because each 
set of company rules would be, by design, unique. In short, the fac-
tors which are crucial to making universalistic rulemaking such a 
time-consuming business are absent from particularistic rulemaking. 
This claim could be tested empirically by observing particularistic 
83. See Stone, The Place of Enterprise Liability in the Control of Corporate Conduct, 90 
YALE LJ. 1, 44-45 (1980). 
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rulemaking in action with air safety84 and other regulatory areas. 
There is already some evidence to suggest that particularistic 
rules may not demand a much greater effort by regulatory officials. 
In the area ofroof control, dust control, and ventilation plans written 
by coal mining companies, Mine Safety and Health Administration 
officials indicated that while the approval process was time-consum-
ing when first introduced, most plan approvals now can be finished 
with only a couple of person-days of agency time. With dust control 
plans, the process has become so routinized that about ninety per-
cent of submissions are simply agency-supplied questionnaires com-
pleted by the company. Innovative plans, of course, require a 
lengthy narrative submission as well, and approval of these may con-
sume up to thirty person-days of time. Plan approval has certainly 
not turned out to be a bureaucratic nightmare; company representa-
tives hold informal discussions with government officials to ascertain 
whether a new approach is likely to be acceptable before formally 
submitting it. 
Company rules need only be as individualized as the companies 
themselves choose. One would undoubtedly find that companies 
participating in enforced self-regulation would adopt large blocks of 
rules from other companies, or would adapt model rules suggested 
by their industry trade association or the regulatory agency. Much 
of the ratification work of the regulatory agency would be routine. 
Even so, it must be conceded that the increased costs of scrutinizing 
thousands of sets of rules might outweigh the savings from the 
greater simplicity of particularistic rules. My guess is that they 
would not, given that the ratification of routine particularistic rules 
could be entrusted to relatively junior civil servants following guide-
lines handed down to them, while universalistic rules of necessity 
must be debated by many senior civil servants and politicians. 85 
84. What one might expect to find from such empirical work is a fairly routine, perfunc-
tory approval of standard rules for common flight paths (e.g., New York-London) and one 
hopes, very painstaking scrutiny of out-of-the-ordinary routes (e.g., Auckland-Antarctica). It 
was the failure of this special regulatory scrutiny which was partially responsible for the Mt. 
Erebus DC-10 crash in Antarctica. See note 48 supra. In other words, the problem was that 
the regulatory costs being shouldered were less than they should have been. 
85. It could be suggested that the relatively junior civil servants to whom power over ap-
proving rules would have to be decentralized would be less formidable adversaries to corpo-
rate might than the senior bureaucrats who currently control rulemaking. My experience of 
regulatory agencies, however, is that employees who are anti-business firebrands tend to re-
main in junior positions, while bureaucrats who have a "cooperative relationship" with indus-
try make it to the top. As support for this view, note many of the findings of the Dorsen 
investigation into allegations of victimization of adversarial employees of the Food and Drug 
Administration. See U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, Eouc. & WELFARE, REVIEW PANEL ON NEW 
DRUG REGULATION, FINAL REPORT 17 (1977). 
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Even if the rulemaking costs were greater, this would be more than 
counterbalanced by the reduced costs of enforcement pointed to ear-
lier. Since enforcing a rule always costs more than writing it, en-
forced self-regulation would save taxpayers more money in the 
enforcement area than it would cost them in the rulemaking domain. 
B. Cooptation of the Regulatory Process by Business 
Would Be Worsened 
Universalistic rulemaking, it might be argued, draws out broader 
resistance to the will of business than could be expected of particu-
laristic rulemaking. Ralph Nader or the Friends of the Earth are 
more likely to organize against a more lax nationwide effluent stan-
dard than they are to oppose an effluent permit for one factory. On 
the other hand, local citizens who would never be activists at a na-
tional level might protest effluent standards which allowed dis-
charges into their neighborhood fishing hole. 
One of the issues to be considered in weighing the relative advan-
tages of particularism and universalism for a given problem is the 
extent to which the prospects for popular participation are national 
versus local. With regulation of mine roof control plans, for exam-
ple, more interest can be expected from the miners who will be cov-
ered by a particular roof plan than from any national activism over 
coal mine roof safety. And in fact, federal mine safety officials told 
me of examples where protests by local miners had forced the Mine 
Safety and Health Administration to reverse its approval of roof 
control plans. In certain circumstances, particularism can harness 
democratic participation more e.ff ectively than universalism. 
In other cases, national debate is obviously more appropriate in 
determining regulatory goals. For example, in setting maximum al-
lowable limits for dust concentration in coal mines, not only should 
mine owners and miners have a say, but also insurance companies, 
epidemiologists, and others. Here, the dangers of cooptation at a lo-
cal level are too immense to be countenanced; we simply do not 
want a situation where local agreements are being negotiated. The 
maximum allowable coal dust level should be national and nonnego-
tiable, and any mine which cannot meet that requirement should go 
out of business. 
There are many areas where the dangers of cosy local agreements 
would be intolerable. However, cooptation can be controlled in 
many cases by a particularism severely constrained by overarching 
standards which were themselves products of national debate. 
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C. Companies Would Bear Increased Costs in Delay and 
. Paperwork from Getting New Company Rules Approved 
1493 
At the outset, it must be noted that requiring companies to write 
the private rules which would be the basis of public enforcement 
should not impose new costs on them. If companies are not pres-
ently writing and enforcing their own rules on safety, environment, 
accounting, and other regulatory areas, then there is something very 
wrong. The only new costs to a reputable company would come in 
the delay and paperwork required in submitting these rules for gov-
ernment approval. As with governmental costs, the costs to business 
of enforced self-regulation could be counterbalanced by savings 
from having to learn, communicate, and follow one set of rules in-
stead of two (government and corporate); from following rules which 
were simpler than existing government regulations; from being able 
to innovate in new and cheaper control methods; and from no longer 
having to follow universalistic rules which were particularistically ir-
rational or cost-ineffective. 
D. Western Jurisprudence Might Not Be Able to Accommodate 
Privately Written Rules Being Accorded the Status of 
Publicly Enforceable Laws 
A detailed legal feasibility study would be premature for a new 
model such as this, which is yet to be evaluated and criticized by 
others for its conceptual flaws. While broadly drawing attention to 
the fact that legal tradition could pose some practical difficulties for 
the implementation of enforced self-regulation, 86 it must also be 
pointed out that the proposal runs with the tide of growing judicial 
recognition of privately written rules. William Evan has described 
the increasing tendency 
for the norms of private legal systems to be judicially recognized, as for 
example, in a medical malpractice suit in which the code of ethics of 
the American Medical Association is invoked; in a suit involving the 
internal relations of a trade union in which the union's constitutional 
86. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936), in which the Court struck down 
federal legislation allowing coal producers to set prices for bituminous coal and to fix wages, 
hours, and working conditions for miners. However, the Court has since declined to review an 
opinion upholding the National Association of Securities Dealers' regulation of the over-the-
counter securities market, First Jersey Sec., Inc. v. Bergen, 605 F.2d 690 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. 
denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980). See also Note, Rethinking Regulation: Negotiation as an Alterna-
tive-to Traditional Rulemaking, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1871, 1880-83 (1981) (discussing the consti-
tutional limits of delegating regulatory authority to private entities). The Note suggests that 
much of the antipathy to private delegation stems from due process concerns about companies 
being regulated by competitors; on the other hand, laws that placed ultimate regulatory au-
thority in the government have been upheld. See First Jersey Sec., Inc. v. Bergen, 605 F.2d 
690 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980). 
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provisions are accorded legal status by the court; or in a suit by a stu-
dent against a college or university in which the institution's discipli-
nary rules are judicially recognized. . . . The adoption, as it were, of 
the norms of private legal systems by public legal systems is function-
ally equivalent to the conferral of rights on private legal systems. 87 
Moreover, we have seen that quite developed examples of enforced 
self-regulation have evolved already in the United States without 
constitutional challenge. Indeed, we have discussed one instance 
where a person was imprisoned under public enforcement of pri-
vately written law. 88 Imprisonment being provided for violations 
which are particularistic rather than universalistic is not novel. Per-
mits under the Clel!fi Water Act regulating the amount of effluent 
which can be discharged from a source vary enormously in strin-
gency, depending upon the part of the country in which the source is 
located in, whether the plant is new or old, the economic viability of 
the industry, and whether pollution reduction is being achieved at a 
particular time. Even though this is a law which is applied in a cal-
culatedly unequal fashion, there is provision for imprisonment for 
any person who willfully or negligently violates a permit condition. 89 
The American legal system has already demonstrated that it will tol-
erate a law enforcement mode which rejects universalism in favor of 
particularism. 
E. Particularistic Laws Might Weaken the Moral Force of Laws 
That Should .Be Universal 
Allowing companies to write their own rules could replace abso-
lute standards with a moral relativism, making the rule of law seem 
an arbitrary matter. Whether the authority of law would be enf ee-
bled would depend on how firmly regulatory agencies insisted that 
important absolute standards be reflected in all sets of particularistic 
rules. It would depend also on how firmly the legislature dealt with 
regulatory agencies that ignored the overarching standards gov-
erning self-regulation plans. 
Ultimately, however, the law derives most of its moral force from 
the stigma of conviction. More stigma would attach to corporate 
crime if more corporate criminals were prosecuted and convicted. If, 
as this Article has suggested, enforced self-regulation would improve 
the current dismally low conviction rate of corporate criminals, then 
87. Evan, Public and Private Legal Systems, in LAW AND SoCIOLOOY 165, 176 (W. Evan 
ed. 1962). 
88. See text at note 61 supra. 
89. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(l) (Supp. I 1977). 
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adoption of the concept could strengthen, not weaken, the moral au-
thority of corporate criminal law. 
F. The Model Would Encourage the Trend to 
"Industrial Absolutism" 
Sixty years ago, Justice Louis Brandeis testified to the Commis-
sion on Industrial Relations that as corporations became larger and 
more powerful, the threat of "industrial absolutism" became more 
profound.9° Corporations can be as powerful as governments, yet 
lack the checks and balances against abuses of that power to which 
governments are subject. Employees do not vote in the private gov-
ernment of corporations. When the corporation sanctions an em-
ployee, there is no obligation for a public hearing, no observance of 
a right to silence, no due process. Giving the corporation power over 
lawmaking, it could be argued, would surely take us one large step 
closer to the industrial absolutism Brandeis warned us against. 
This line of attack on enforced self-regulation can be easily dis-
missed. It is not as if corporations do not already have policies 
under which employees are dismissed, demoted, and sanctioned in 
other ways. Enforced self-regulation would in some measure control 
industrial absolutism by requiring that corporate policies be made 
subject to veto by a democratically constituted government.91 This is 
not to deny that industrial absolutism is a problem; it is simply to say 
that enforced self-regulation would not contribute to it. Indeed, it 
should be hoped that the formalization of corporate compliance pol-
icies which would come with enforced self-regulation would be ac-
companied by a formalization of due process protections for 
employees. 
G. Companies Would Write Their Rules in Ways 'Which Would 
Assist Them To Evade the Spirit of the Law 
Companies have a long history of deviousness at finding ways of 
evading their public responsibilities.92 By giving them control over 
90. Quoted in R. EELLS, THE GOVERNMENT OF CORPORATIONS 210 (1962). 
91. The democratic ideal is not strengthened only by holding the unelected government of 
corporations accountable to the elected government of the state, but also by grass roots par-
ticipatory possibilities under enforced self-regulation. Already, American regulatory agencies 
which have opted to give public recognition to privately written rules have provided for public 
comment on such recognition. For example, the Mine Safety and Health Administration gives 
notice to miners and their representatives of agreements it has made with mining companies 
on ventilation and roofing plans, and of petitions for modifications to the regulations for par-
ticular mines. 
92. For illustrations, see generally M. CLINARD & P. YEAGER, supra note 2; M. GREEN, 
THE OTHER GOVERNMENT (1975). 
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the rule-writing process, one might give full reign to their ingenuity 
at pulling the wool over the eyes of governments. For a start, com-
panies could evade liability by simply failing to write required rules 
(though this could be dealt with by making the penalties for not hav-
ing rules more severe than those for breaking them). Many compa-
nies would surely manage to sneak provisions into their rules 
without the regulatory agency realizing the full implications of the 
provisions. One can be assured that company lawyers would spend 
more time working over their rules with a fine tooth comb than 
would any government employee. 
There can be no satisfactory answer to this criticism of enforced 
self-regulation except to say that, in one way or another, the business 
community's resourcefulness at law evasion will be cause for weak-
ness in any system of control. As has been argued above, the oppor-
tunities for evasion and exploitation of loopholes are endemic in 
universalistic laws controlling business practices. I strongly suspect 
that simple, particularistic rules over which business had considera-
ble control would not be more susceptible to evasion than complex 
rules over which business had less control93 because the whole inher-
ited wisdom from the study of corporate crime is that it is complexity 
which makes conviction so often impossible. Ultimately, however, 
this question can only be answered empirically. 
H. Companies Cannot Command Compliance as 
Effectively as Government 
While most of the other objections to enforced self-regulation 
tum on the presumed capacity of the corporation to control its envi-
ronment in ways that would evade the impact of regulation, this ob-
jection looks to the ineffectiveness of control in large organizations. 
In a provocative essay, Thomas Schelling has argued that the man-
agers of large organizations are rarely in a position simply to issue 
instructions and expect that they will be carried out.94 Moreover, in 
some cases the only way that executives can secure compliance with 
their instructions is when government backs those instructions. 
93. It would also be wrong to assume that business has no control over existing govern-
mental rulemaking. Joseph Stetler, former president of the American Pharmaceutical Manu-
facturing Association, once co=ented: "As I look back over three or four years, we have 
co=ented on 60 different proposed regulations. At least a third were never published in final 
form. And every one, without exception, picked up a significant part of our suggestions." R. 
HUGHES & R. BREWIN, THE TRANQUILIZING OF AMERICA 229 (1979). An official of the Asso-
ciation of the British Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Industry told me that many British gov-
ernment regulations were written in their offices. 
94. Schelling, Command and Control, in SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE BUSINESS PRE· 
DICAMENT (J. McKie ed. 1974). 
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Hence, the board cannot fight resistance from the ranks to affirma-
tive action until the government mandates affirmative action and the 
directors can plead that the matter is beyond their control. Similarly, 
corporate policies which require the wearing of safety helmets or air-
filter masks are notoriously hard to enforce; compliance works best 
when management can say that the government insists upon it.95 
The Schelling argument does not pinpoint a weakness of en-
forced self-regulation, but of voluntary self-regulation. Corporate 
power and the sense oflegitimacy 96 needed to command compliance 
may be weak when such orders do not have the force of law. Be-
cause self-generated rules have legal force under enforced self-regu-
lation, however, the state can be seen as backing the corporate 
command. In fact, a strength of enforced self-regulation is that it 
summons the legitimacy of both state and corporate power to entice 
compliance while the alternative regulatory models rest on the legiti-
macy of corporate power alone or of state power alone. 
I. The Independence of the Compliance Group Could Never Be 
Fully Guaranteed 
An independent internal compliance group is essential to the suc-
cess of an enforced self-regulation scheme. There are two principal 
threats to the compliance unit's independence. The first is internal. 
The group, through a sense of corporate loyalty, might itself 
subordinate regulatory zeal to the attainment of the firm's produc-
tivity goals. My study of the pharmaceutical industry97 concluded 
that this threat may be somewhat overstated. In that industry, pres-
tige, promotion, and job satisfaction for compliance group personnel 
were generally a function of their competence at discovering and 
correcting regulatory problems. Their professional commitment was 
aimed at ensuring compliance rather than at making profits, and 
their careers were oriented more to their subunit's goals than to the 
overall profit goals of the company. Indeed, companies themselves 
encouraged the compliance groups to strive uncompromisingly for 
excellence in ensuring compliance, lest defective products slip 
through, creating 'legal problems and customer dissatisfaction. 
In the field of occupational safety, moreover, the divided-loyal-
ties problem can be somewhat reduced by including worker or union 
representatives in the compliance group. Presumably, union mem-
95. Id at 86. 
96. "Legitimacy" is being used here in the sociological sense; as a condition of general 
acceptance by the public as authorized by, or in accord with, prevailing values. 
97. To be published in J. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 6 (forthcoming). 
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bers or non.management personnel would generally be less willing to 
subordinate their personal safety to profit goals. To minimize fur-
ther the chance of cooptation by management, worker representa-
tives can be given only a short tenure in the compliance unit.98 
The second threat to the compliance group's independence ema-
nates from the corporation itself; despite an overall commitment to 
regulatory goals, the compliance groups would be compromised 
when management determined that the unit's recommendations 
were not in the company's long-run best interests. Here, indepen-
dence can be strengthened by having directors of compliance report 
directly to the chief executive or a board audit committee. My inter-
views with pharmaceutical industry executives revealed the impor-
tance of such independence from middle-management pressure. 
There are occasions when it is economically rational temporarily to 
suspend commitment to quality standards. If a product is in short 
supply and major customers are complaining to the marketing man-
ager, that executive may pressure the quality control manager to pass 
an almost-acceptable batch as acceptable. This pressure can be par-
ticularly acute when major customers threaten to switch to a compet-
itor unless continuity of supply is guaranteed. An individual plant 
manager can also request the quality control director to reverse a 
regulatory decision, as when the plant had to achieve certain produc-
tion goals. 
These opportunities for meddling can be limited if the corpora-
tion is structured so that the quality control director does not have to 
answer to manufacturing or marketing vice-presidents. In some 
American pharmaceutical companies, the quality control director 
makes an independent written decision on each drug batch, which he 
then signs. Only the president can overrule this judgment, and he 
must do so in writing. The potential for chief executive overruling is 
far lower than it would be for a veto by a marketing or manufactur-
ing manager. People become corporation presidents in part because 
they exhibit a modicum of caution. Imagine the consequences for a 
president if customers are seriously injured because he personally 
overruled Jl quality control decision. No matter how low the chances 
of this event occurring were perceived to be, it would be a foolish 
risk for a corporation president to take for the sake of one batch of 
98. The leading example of worker participation in OSHA self-inspection programs is the 
so-called Bechtel plan. At Bechtel Group Inc.'s nuclear power plant at San Onofre, California, 
OSHA blessing has been given to monthly labor-management safety inspections as an alterna-
tive to government inspections. Under this plan management must explain its reasons for not 
adopting the recommendations of the inspection team. See Lublin, OSHA Head Wants to Cut 
Regulation, Using Labor-Management Inspections, Wall St. J., Mar. 26, 1981, at 8, col. 4. 
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product. While the destruction of a batch might be a major aggrava-
tion to the marketing or manufacturing manager, to the president it 
is a minor matter. Effectively then, organizational structure lessens 
the chances of quality control being formally overruled. 
In multiple-division corporations, compliance heads within each 
division or subsidiary, in turn, should have only a dotted-line report-
ing relationship with the chief executive officer of their subsidiary 
and a firm line to their immediate superior within the compliance 
group. It should be their compliance boss who hires and fires them, 
and who determines their yearly bonuses, not the subsidiary chief 
executive. Their future should be linked to their performance in se-
curing compliance, not with their success in pleasing a chief 
executive.99 
The best guarantee of compliance group independence is exter-
nal: making the failure to report unrectified violations a crime. Reg-
ulatory agencies would continually audit to determine whether the 
group was discovering and reporting violations as it should. Once an 
offense had been discovered, the agency would subpoena the rele-
vant compliance unit reports and uncover any failure of the compli-
ance director to report an unrectified violation. Even a small 
number of prosecutions for this offense would probably be sufficient 
to encourage compliance directors to put the company's head on the 
chopping block - instead of their own. The directors could be fur-
ther required to sign a quarterly declaration that all violations oflaw 
uncovered by the compliance group during that quarter had been 
rectified or reported to the government, and that all compliance 
group recommendations for discipfuiary action against culpable in-
dividuals had also been acted on or reported. 
Under any set of independence guarantees, however, top man-
agement could still find subtle and not-so-subtle ways to bend the 
will of the compliance staff. End top management control through 
reporting relationships, and executives would try to control the com-
pliance unit through budget allocations. If budg~tary controls were 
removed, fewer travel approvals, poor allocation of offices, staff re-
shuffles, and similar steps to make the work life of employees miser-
able could be attempted by management to assert its control. This is 
not to denigrate independence-giving strategies such as granting con-
trol of budgets for subsidiary and divisional compliance units to the 
corporate compliance group rather than to subsidiary or divisional 
99. It might also be desirable to require companies to notify the regulatory agency of the 
dismissal of a compliance director and to give reasons for such dismissal. 
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chief executives. It is just to say that eliminating all threats to com-
pliance group independence is impossible. Nevertheless, if the major 
incentives (promotion and budget allocation) are controlled by other 
compliance people, then, in spite of residual disincentives, compli-
ance executives will derive the greatest rewards from success at en-
suring that the rules are obeyed. 
The impossibility of assuring independence for the compliance 
group was the greatest concern of readers of earlier drafts of this 
essay. My response to them was at two levels. The first response is 
empirical; I had seen many companies in the pharmaceutical indus-
try with tough, independent compliance groups which frequently 
won internal battles against executives who wished to put profits 
ahead of safety. Or I would suggest to the cynics that they go to any 
coal mine in the United States and read preshift examiners' reports 
which regularly record serious violations of law law for further con-
sideration by government inspectors. Undoubtedly preshift examin-
ers fail to report all they should, but they do report a lot. 
My second response goes to what I believe are mistaken pre-
sumptions as to corporate structure. The assumption that internal 
compliance groups will be impotent is based upon too monolithic a 
conception of corporations, one which assumes that they are totally 
controlled from the top down. 100 If subunits such as compliance 
groups develop enough momentum within the organization, in prac-
tical terms it can be difficult for the chief executive officer to bend 
them to his will. Chief executives are, in many senses, politicians 
who cannot afford continually to antagonize significant corporate 
constituencies, lest they refuse to cooperate with him when their help 
or loyalty is really needed. This is true whether one is talking about 
the president of a university trying to restructure the geography de-
partment or the president of a coal company trying to trim the safety 
staff. Politicians, in short, are never omnipotent. And if internal 
compliance groups are set up in a way that gives them organizational 
clout (e.g., with a senior vice-president at the helm or direct access to 
an audit committee of outside directors), their effectiveness will 
rarely be totally compromised. 
' ' 
V. FOR A MIX OF REGULATORY STRATEGIES 
Not all of the foregoing problems with enforced self-regulation 
can be lightly dismissed. Certainly there is consolation in comparing 
100. q: Schelling, supra note 94, at 80 (noting that corporations are not ''unitary entities" 
but are "small societies comprising many people with different interests, opportunities, infor-
mation, motivations, and group interests"). 
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them to the even more profound pitfalls of voluntary self-regulation 
and government regulation. Enforced self-regulation can never be a 
panacea to the well-documented problems encountered under the 
other two models. To regulate effectively and efficiently the widest 
spectrum of corporate behavior, we must seek some optimal mix of 
regulatory strategies. 
Enforced self-regulation has more bite than voluntary self-regu-
lation organized by a trade association. But the latter still has an 
important place, particularly in areas of business regulation where 
the public interests threatened by corporate conduct are not great 
and where industry does not have a lot to lose or something to gain, 
by toeing the line.101 Voluntary self-regulation is the most attractive 
option here because, lacking government-industry adversariness, it is 
the cheapest option. Even in areas where the consequences of corpo-
rate misconduct are quite profound, voluntary self-regulation can 
usefully supplement governmental control (though never be an alter-
native to it). Had a self-regulation program run by the Pharmaceuti-
cal Manufacturers Association complemented direct regulation by 
the FDA, for example, the MER/29 drug disaster might have been 
averted.102 Here, two competitors of Richardson-Merrell, the makers 
of MER/29, had conducted tests on the drug and found it danger-
ous. Since there was no industry self-regulatory body to which test 
results could be forwarded, these companies were content merely to 
report their warnings to Richardson-Merrell, which promptly ·ig-
nored them. In highly competitive industries, the desire of compa-
nies to prevent competitors from gaining an edge can be harnessed to 
serve the public interest by a voluntary self-regulation program run 
by a trade association. 
Even though enforced self-regulation would be more cost-effec-
. tive than direct government regulation in many areas involving the 
conduct of big business, it could never totally replace the latter. For 
businesses below a certain size, a viable and independent compliance 
unit is impossible. Direct government inspections must be retained 
for small businesses. In particular, government inspectors would 
continue to have a vital role in catching fly-by-night _ope_rators who 
calculatedly operate on the fringe of the law. Medium-sized busi-
nesses perhaps could be given a choice of opting in or out of en-
101. Examples of situations where voluntary self-regulation may be used most effectively 
include the regulation of toy durability (as opposed to safety) by a toymaker trade association, 
or the regulation of product labels that falsely create the impression they were made by an-
other, better known manufacturer. 
102. Details of the MER/29 disaster can be found in Ungar, Get Away With What You 
Can, in IN THE NAME OF PROFIT 106 (R. Heilbronner ed. 1972). 
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forced self-regulation. Small and medium-sized businesses which 
could not sustain a viable and independent compliance unit would 
have to be monitored for law observance directly by government in-
spectors. Nevertheless, the laws being observed could still be laws 
privately written and publicly ratified according to the enforced self-
regulation model. Smaller companies which could not be bothered 
writing their own rules could choose one of a number of standard 
packages for companies of different types made available by the reg-
ulatory agency. Or, more simply, they could copy another com-
pany's rules from the public register of company rules. 
Even for big business, a modicum of direct inspection must be 
retained. This would keep the internal compliance group on its toes. 
At this point, I can envision business people throwing their hands up 
in horror, and exclaiming, "so the bottom line is to keep the old gov-
ernment inspections while adding just another regulatory layer onto 
them-" Not so. What is being suggested here is a reallocation of 
regulatory resources, not a multiplication of them, a shift from ex-
penditures on direct inspection to expenditures on audits of corpo-
rate compliance groups. It happens to be my belief that in general, 
governments should increase their budgets for business regulation, 
but such a belief is not relevant to the present proposal. 
A fundamental principle for the allocation of scarce regulatory 
resources ought to be that they are directed away from companies 
with demonstrably effective self-regulatory systems and concentrated 
on companies which play fast and loose. In addition to providing 
incentives for self-regulation, such a policy would tend to channel 
enforcement toward the companies most likely to offend. Regula-
tory agencies at the moment often provide disincentives for effective 
self-regulation. SmithKline executives drew one example to my at-
tention. In 1979, the company conducted a detailed in-house exami-
nation which discovered contaminants in two of its nasal sprays. 
Instead of hushing up the problem, SmithK.line treated the employee 
who discovered the contaminant as something of a hero. Her efforts 
were held up as an example of the kind of vigilance required for the 
sake of product purity. SmithKline notified FDA that 1.2 million 
bottles of nasal spray were being recalled from drug stores and su-
permarkets around the country. According to the executives, they 
felt terribly discouraged when the government issued a press release 
which created the impression that the FDA had discovered the prob-
lem and forced SmithKline into the recall. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Article has suggested that enforced self-regulation could 
play an important role in a fundamental redeployment of govern-
mental expenditures for regulating business. Under enforced self-
regulation, each company would write its own rules. Once these rules 
had been ratified by the government, a violation of them would be 
an offense.• The company would be required to establish an internal 
compliance group to monitor observance of the ruies and_ recom-
mend disciplinary action against violators. If management were to 
fail to rectify violations or to act on recommendations for discipli-
nary action, the director of compliance would be statutorily required 
to report this fact to the relevant agency. The role of the regulatory 
agency would be to determine that the company rules satisfied all of 
the guidelines set down by government policy, to ensure that the 
compliance group was independent within the corporate bureau-
cracy, to audit the performance of the compliance group, to conduct 
occasional spot inspections of operating units as an independent 
check that the compliance unit was detecting violations, and to 
launch prosecutions, particularly against companies that subverted 
their compliance groups. 
Many very important details of how enforced self-regulation 
might work in practice have not been discussed in this Article. How 
would the legislature set penalties for offenses? How would legisla-
tion deal with the question of intent, so as to ensure that companies 
could not also write their own mens rea standards? How would an 
enforced self-regulation scheme pass constitutional muster? Again, 
it must be emphasized that the purpose of~ Article is not to pres-
ent a packaged legislative proposal, ready for implementation. 
The ideas presented here may sound complex. They are not. The 
Article has attempted to show that one of enforced self-regulation's 
virtues is greater simplicity than direct governmental regulation. 
Approaches that are new always seem more complex than they in 
fact are. Should the reader be asked to explain how the existing 
American regulatory system works to a Martian ( or even an Austra-
lian), it too would seem extremely complicated. 
Whether the strengths of enforced self-regulation outweigh its 
weaknesses depends on what area of regulation is being considered. 
This Article has stressed that there can be strength in the conver-
gence of weaknesses. The challenge is to find an optimal mix of self-
regulation and governmental regulation - a mix that will cover the 
gaps left by one approach with the strengths of another approach. 
By exploiting the advantages and recognizing the weaknesses of en-
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forced self-regulation, voluntary self-regulation, and direct govern-
mental regulation, we might strike a mix that is more effective and 
less expensive than any one- or two-dimensional approach . 
.APPENDIX: THE CORPORATE CASE LAW APPROACH 
Rules have their limits. In a technologically complex industry, 
rules cannot be written to cover every environmental contingency 
that poses a risk of social harm. To be sure, an advantage of self-
regulation is that the rules can more quickly adapt to changing envi-
ronmental realities or newly perceived threats than can laws imposed 
by the state. Even so, however, my research on the pharmaceutical 
industry suggests that an accumulation of many minor acts of social 
irresponsibility (or of many technical breaches) all too frequently 
does greater harm than grossly illegal acts. 103 
The most effective method of combatting minor acts of irrespon-
sibilty is through a corporation's identitive power - the use of sym-
bols to control behavior.104 The culture of a corporation more than 
anything else determines the safety of its products and the extent to 
which workers are needlessly injured or the environment needlessly 
harmed.105 If top management tolerates an atmosphere in which the 
quick fix is accepted, in which rule bending and comer cutting are 
not frowned upon, then both socially irresponsible and illegal acts 
will :flourish.106 The strength of identitive power is that it reaches 
beyond compliance with written rules. Corporations that indoctri-
nate their employees with an attitude that "the responsible way is the 
company way," that "the spirit of the rules is as important as the 
letter of the rules," should be rewarded by regulatory agencies with 
lower levels of governmental intervention. 
The most effective way to inculcate a corporate identity with so-
cially responsible positions may not be through rulemaking, internal 
103. See J. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 6 (forthcoming). 
104. This power is one of three suggested by Professor Etzioni. In addition to identitive 
power, rewarding with prestige, esteem, acceptance, (pointing out "that's not the sort of thing 
an IBMer does,"), there is coercive power, the use of physical means for control purposes (e.g. 
torture, imprisonment, removal from the organization); and utilitarian power, the use of mate-
rial means for control purposes (e.g. promotion, payment of bonuses, allocating capital for 
expansion). Etzioni, Organizational Control Structure, in HANDBOOK OF OROAN1ZATIONS 650, 
651 (J. March ed. 1965). 
105. See C. STONE, supra note 72, at 228-48. 
106. The SEC-mandated internal reports of 1976 regarding foreign bribery at Lockheed 
and Gulf both reached this conclusion - that the tone set by top management is the critical 
determinant of illegal corporate conduct. See Baumart, How Ethical Are Businessmen?, in 
WHITE-COLLAR CRIMINAL 119, 125-27 (G. Geis ed. 1968); Brenner & Molander, Is the Ethics 
of Business Changing?, HARv. Bus. REv. Jan.-Feb. 1977, at 57. 
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or external, but rather through the development of a corporate case 
law. A senior executive of one of Australia's largest companies indi-
cated in a recent interview that his firm was moving toward a "cor-
porate case law approach." In the executive's view, rules could not 
be codified to cover the ever-changing situations that confront execu-
tives with ethical dilemmas. His company, therefore, was beginning 
to attempt to formalize "corporate case law." The fundamental re-
quirement of the concept is that when executives encounter an ethi-
cal dilemma, the problem should be written down. It should then be 
passed up through the organization until it reaches a person who 
knows the existing case law with respect to this class of problems. If· 
existing case law decides the issue, the problem goes no further. But 
if an important precedent could be established, it could go to the 
"supreme court": the firm's chief executive officer. 
A second fundamental requirement of the concept is that any de-
cision be put in writing and sent back down the line. 107 A senior 
executive must take responsibility for collating, conceptualizing, 
cross-referencing, and drawing out general principles from the case 
law. Communicating corporate case law to employees is no greater a 
problem than communicating case law handed down by public 
courts. Corporations have coped admirably with disseminating in 
digestible form the case law in such complex areas as antitrust. Any-
one who has read the antitrust compliance guides provided to em-
ployees by some large American corporations must be impressed by 
the lucid use of examples to inculcate the "dos and don'ts" of com-
petitive conduct. 108 
When the corporate case law becomes widely communicated and 
understood within the organization, the need to pass ethical dilem-
mas up the line decreases because they are simply no longer dilem-
mas. The case law can build a corporate culture in which gray issues 
become black and white. Minimizing the incidence of ethical dilem-
mas is important because of the potential for delay. Corporations 
often make the right decisions at the wrong time because they pre-
varicate while dilemmas are passed up the line. Authority must be 
107. Exxon has exemplary policies in this regard. When an individual reports a rule viola-
tion up the line, the executive to whom the report is made has an obligation to report back to 
the person who made the report what action has been taken. If the latter does not receive this 
feedback, he or she knows that somewhere the bad news has been blocked. He or she then has 
an obligation to report the breakdown directly to the audit committee of the board. This 
builds in a strong disincentive against orchestrated communication blockages to cover up a 
violation. See B. FISSE & J. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 6 (forthcoming). 
108. Outstanding examples of such manuals include IBM's BUSINESS CONDUCT GUIDE-
LINES and DATA PROCESSING DMSION GENERAL MARKETING GUIDELINES (Sept. 1980), and 
General Electric's POLICY ON COMPLIANCE WITH THE ANTITRUST LAWS 20.5 (1970). 
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devolved if corporations are to maximize their capacity to seize upon 
opportunities when they present themselves. 109 Hence it is essential 
that corporate case law be proactive rather than simply reactive. 
The formalized organization and reporting of corporate case law 
would benefit both the regulators and the regulated. A formalized 
case law would render corporate decision-making processes more 
vulnerable to criticism. Criticizing unexplicated rules is of less value 
than reading and responding to actual key decisions. The corporate 
case law approach could never do away with the need for rules. It 
could, however, reduce their number and diminish the perennial bu-
reaucratic problem of rules hamstringing action when they are not 
really apposite to the specific situation. For top management, for-
malized corporate case law can tighten management control and re-
duce the risk of wild, idiosyncratic decisions. Costs would not be 
great. Executives do not encounter ethical dilemmas every day of the 
week; when they do, a more senior person who has encountered 
problems of this type before should be able to resolve the dilemma 
rapidly. If the company is criticized for the ethical stance it has 
taken on a particular issue, the board of directors can be provided 
with a definitive summary of the relevant case law. The cases are in 
the files for them to inspect. Criticism can be directed not only at the 
wording of rules, but at the managerial judgments underlying the 
resolution of specific dilemmas that set important precedents. 
How would enforced self-regulation be adapted to a compliance 
system based more on case law than on statute law? It would work 
by giving the regulatory agency direct access to the written case law. 
Instead of devoting their time to monitoring rules, regulators would 
read the cases to ~nsure the critical ethical dilemmas were not being 
decided without recourse to this case law. The inspectors would also 
be charged with ensuring that the decisions reached were in accord 
with governmental standards. 
Persuading jurists to recognize private case law in public courts 
could be an even greater task than obtaining such recognition for 
privately written rules. 110 Under enforced self-regulation, however, 
the case law would be ratified by the state and would thus, in es-
sence, be only semi-private. Periodic review of the case law by the 
regulatory agency could result in the overturning of decisions and 
109. This is particularly true with larger organizations. The larger the organization, the 
greater the devolution of decision-making power. This was demonstrated empirically by 
Mileti, Gillespie & Eitzen, Structure and .Decision Making in Corporate Organizations, 63 Soc1-
0LOGY & Soc. REsEARCH 723 (1979). 
110. See Part J.V-D supra. 
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principles that failed to conform to the government's overarching 
standards. Aggrieved consumers, competitors, or employees could 
also appeal to the agency for such relief. 
In conclusion, let me state that I am not an advocate of the cor-
porate case law approach, at least not in any immediate or practical 
sense. Important details must be worked out before the concept can 
be seriously considered. It does, however, present an alternative or 
complementary method to rule-based enforced self-regulation that 
bears further study. 
